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Abstract: On 12 September 2017, the United Kingdom joined 
128 other States in officially becoming party to the 1954 Hague Con-
vention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict and its two Protocols. The UK first signed the Hague Con-
vention in December 1954, but did not ratify it for 60 years. As po-
litical pressure mounted in recent years to recognize the necessity 
of safeguarding of cultural heritage both at home and abroad, the 
current government undertook to rectify the delay in bringing the 
UK’s obligations up to international standards in this field. This pa-
per examines both the process and its legislative outcome. It argues 
that this ratification came as a much-awaited and welcome step, 
in particular because it allows for domestic prosecutions of serious 
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breaches of the Second Protocol against non-nationals. By contrast, 
the ratification represented a missed opportunity to tackle some of 
the more challenging and topical issues related to the material and 
personal scope of application of the Hague Convention and its Pro-
tocols, as well as to the definition of cultural property. 
Keywords: United Kingdom, Cultural Property Act, non-state 
organized armed groups, criminal responsibility, protection, 
1954 Hague Convention, non-international armed conflicts, Syria
Introduction
On 12 September 2017, the United Kingdom joined 128 other States in official-
ly becoming Party to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (“the Hague Convention”) and its two Pro-
tocols.1 The UK had been the last member of the UN Security Council to ratify the 
Hague Convention, but became the second – after France – to ratify the treaty to-
gether with both its Protocols. 
It had been a long time coming. The UK first signed the Hague Convention in 
December 1954, but did not ratify it for 60 years because, together with a number 
of other countries, it considered that the treaty did not provide an effective regime 
for the protection of cultural property.2 
As political pressure grew to recognize the necessity of safeguarding of cultur-
al heritage both at home and abroad, Theresa May’s government undertook to rec-
tify the delay in bringing the UK’s obligations up to international standards in this 
field.3 Taking into account the passage of time and the changing realities of modern 
warfare, one would have expected the ratification of the treaty to have created 
an opportunity to examine in more depth the problems surrounding the applicabil-
ity of the treaty in the context of modern conflicts. But was this undertaken, and 
what has been achieved in the process? This paper aims to examine the process 
1 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954, 249 
UNTS 240, reprinted in: D. Schindler, J. Toman (eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 4th edn., Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden 2004, pp. 999-1025; Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 358 (“First Protocol”), reprinted in: ibidem, pp. 1027-1033; Second Protocol to the 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, 
2253 UNTS 212 (“Second Protocol”), reprinted in: ibidem, pp. 1037-1051.
2 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, January 2008, 
Cm 7798 (“Draft Bill 2008”), p. 84.
3 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Ratification of 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Accession to Its Two Protocols (of 1954 and 1999), Impact 
Assessment, 1 May 2016, pp. 1, 5.
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and its legislative outcome. It will first look into the legislative history of the UK’s 
ratification process. It will then offer some comments about the Cultural Property 
(Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, focusing in particular on three areas subject to more in-
tense Parliamentary debates – namely the material and personal applicability of the 
Act and the scope of the definition of cultural property as incorporated in the Act. 
Legislative History
Pre-2015 efforts to ratify the Hague Convention 
The delay in ratifying the Hague Convention was never the result of a lack of in-
terest in, or respect for, the rules governing the protection of cultural property. 
The UK not only signed the Hague Convention in 1954, but also played an active 
part in drafting the Convention in the early 1950s.4 The UK did not accede at that 
time to its First Protocol.5 At the same time, a number of the UK’s proposals were 
clearly not accepted in the final version of the Hague Convention, including those 
related to criminal responsibility.6 As a result, UK governments became adverse 
to ratification and, as stated in 1958, felt that the provisions were “very complex” 
and required further examination.7 Subsequently, the UK explained its position in 
more detail. In 2014, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport said that the 
Hague Convention “did not provide an effective regime for the protection of cultur-
al property”, it “did not contain adequate criminal sanctions” and that it contained 
imprecise terms.8 The type of protection enshrined in the First Protocol, i.e. special 
protection aimed to prevent the export of cultural property from the occupied ter-
ritories, was also deemed too political.9 Following a joint Dutch and UNESCO re-
view in 1991 of the working of the Hague Convention and the Protocol, the Second 
Protocol was adopted in 1999. The UK had also been involved in negotiating this 
latter Protocol.10 The adoption of the Second Protocol dispelled all the concerns 
04 UNESCO, Records of the Conference Convened by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Or-
ganization, Held at The Hague from 21 April to 14 May 1954, Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, The Hague 
1961.
05 The UK signed the Hague Convention on 30 December 1954. The UNESCO Convention for the Protec-
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for Execution of the Convention 
1954 – Opened for Signature is available here: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_
DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#SIGNATURE [accessed: 14.01.2018].
06 UNESCO, Records…, p. 390, UNESCO Docs CBC/DR/87 (UK).
07 Protection of Cultural Property (Convention), HC Deb (19 November 1958) vol. 595 col. 1142.
08 House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) 
Bill, 15 July 2008, HC 693 (“CMSC Draft Bill”), pp. 6-7; Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Hague 
Convention 1954, 12 February 2014, http://old.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/cultural_property/6630.aspx 
[accessed: 20.09.2017].














that the UK authorities had previously had.11 Consequently, after the Second Pro-
tocol came into force in March 2004, the UK announced its readiness to ratify the 
Hague Convention and its two Protocols in May 2004, on the 50th anniversary 
of the adoption of the Hague Convention and its First Protocol. In the following 
year, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport undertook a consultation exer-
cise on the implementation of the Hague Convention, the responses to which were 
published in October 2006.12 
The 2005 Department for Culture, Media and Sport survey showed clearly 
that existing domestic laws were inadequate to meet the obligations of the Hague 
Convention, particularly in the area of criminal sanctions.13 For example, none of 
the existing criminal offences under Section 1(1) of the Geneva Conventions Act 
1957, or Section 51 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001, were considered 
adequate.14 The definition of cultural property under the Hague Convention was 
broader than in any of these acts.15 In addition, the British legislation did not ad-
dress the offence of using cultural property under enhanced protection in support 
of military operations, as required by Article 15(1)(b) of the Second Protocol. 
Furthermore, there was no specific protection given to the distinctive emblem 
of the Hague Convention, the Blue Shield emblem, despite the requirement of Arti-
cle 16 of the Hague Convention. The Geneva Conventions Act 1957 only provided 
for the protection of the Red Cross and its related emblems. The Act enshrined the 
prohibition of any perfidious use of these emblems,16 in line with the requirements of 
Article 85(3) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.17 There were 
three problems with this Act vis-à-vis the Hague Convention. First, it was not clear 
whether this actually covered the specific cultural property emblem, or just the Red 
Cross, Red Crescent, and now Red Crystal emblems. Secondly, Article 85(3)(f) of Ad-
ditional Protocol I considers “perfidious use” of a cultural emblem as a grave breach 
of this Protocol, however Article 17 of the Second Protocol sets out broader con-
11 Draft Bill 2008.
12 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Consultation Paper on: The 1954 Hague Convention on the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols of 1954 and 1999, September 
2005, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100512164615/http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/
consultations/HagueConvention.pdf [accessed: 20.09.2017].
13 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Com-
mittee Reports on the Draft Heritage Protection Bill and Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, October 
2008, Cm 7472 (“Government Response 2008”), pp. 22-24.
14 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, Explanatory Notes, 
published together with Draft Bill, May 2016, para. 13.
15 Draft Bill 2008, p. 85.
16 Section 6 of Geneva Conventions Act 1957, Chapter 52 5 and 6 Eliz 2, 31 July 1957, with subsequent 
amendments.
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (“Additional Protocol I”), 
reprinted in: D. Schindler, J. Toman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 711-773.
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ditions of situations in which such “use” is forbidden; uses which, in most cases, will 
not be perfidious.18 Thirdly, the Hague Convention also extended its reach to armed 
conflicts of a non-international character, which was outside the scope of the rele-
vant provisions of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. As such, this Act was deemed 
insufficient to fulfil the requirements of the Hague Convention regime.19
Specifically in relation to the 1954 First Protocol, the UK’s existing legislation 
lacked a fully comprehensive set of measures designed to suppress any unlawful 
export of cultural property, taking into custody such property imported from oc-
cupied territory, or its return upon the close of hostilities. Whilst there have been 
some offences which could have been applied in relation to cases where there was 
allegedly an unlawful exportation of cultural property from an occupied territo-
ry – in accordance with the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003, Sec-
tion 3(1)(a) of which criminalizes the import of “tainted” cultural property – the Act 
did not include any provisions enabling the seizure (retention in custody) or return 
of that cultural property.20 Equally, there were no effective measures to grant im-
munity from “seizure, placing in prize or capture” of any cultural property and any 
means of transport exclusively involved in the transfers of such property protected 
under Articles 12 and 13, particularly when on the UK’s territory.21
The introduction of new legislation to address the shortcomings of the exist-
ing framework was preferable to the possible risk of the UK being in breach of its 
obligations under the Hague Convention. In January 2008, draft legislation was 
published as the Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill.22 The draft Bill was, 
by and large, very well received among Parliamentarians.23 The Government’s plan 
at that time was to introduce primary legislation, entitled The Cultural Heritage 
Bill, alongside the Bill on cultural property. This was, however, never tabled for con-
sideration by subsequent Parliaments.24 
The unquestionable need to ratify the Hague Convention had clearly ma-
tured by 2008 and was driven by two underlying considerations. First, the Gov-
ernment felt that it was necessary to formalize the responsibilities of members of 
the UK’s armed forces operating in armed conflicts overseas.25 Secondly, the pro-
18 See also Section 1(1) of Geneva Conventions Act 1957. Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Cul-
tural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, Explanatory Notes, para. 15.
19 Ibidem.
20 “Tainted” cultural objects are defined as those which are unlawfully removed or excavated, after 30 De-
cember 2003, from a building or structure, monument of historical, architectural, or archaeological inter-
est, whether in UK or abroad. Section 2(1-3) of Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003, Chap-
ter 27, 30 October 2003; Draft Bill 2008, p. 86.
21 Article 14 of the Hague Convention.
22 Draft Bill 2008.
23 CMSC Draft Bill, p. 3.
24 Government Response 2008, p. 3.













tections offered by the Hague Convention were seen as ensuring the protection 
of the UK’s cultural property in the event of an armed conflict involving a State 
which was High Contracting Party to this treaty.26 This constitutes recognition of 
the important incentive of reciprocal protection which is contained in the Hague 
Convention and its Protocols. 
Most importantly, the 2008 draft Bill affirmed the UK’s existing commitment 
to implementing the rules related to the protection of cultural property in armed 
conflicts. It recognized that the 1954 Hague Convention had been treated by 
British armed forces as being part of customary international law.27 In practice, the 
relevant rules were included in the Tri-Service Manual and, as such, became part 
of the training for British troops.28 This included the fundamental rules of ensur-
ing respect for cultural property when undertaking military operations, and taking 
reasonable care to avoid attacking cultural property, even if it was being used for 
military purposes.
The UK’s recent involvement in armed conflicts has certainly not raised ma-
jor concerns about compliance with the norms dedicated to the protection of cul-
tural property. Bearing all this in mind, the Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
concluded in 2008 that the future Act was unlikely to restrain military operations 
unduly.29 On the contrary, the Committee felt that it would “if enacted, strength-
en the procedures used by the Ministry of Defence when training personnel in 
respect of cultural property and taking cultural sites into account when planning 
operations”.30 
Renewed push towards ratification (2015-2017)
Despite its seemingly cross-party support and the occasional reiteration of the 
Government’s commitment to ratify the Hague Convention, the effort to actual-
ly put this Bill through the Parliamentary process was not revived until mid-2015, 
when the Government announced it was committed to securing the relevant legis-
lation at the “earliest opportunity”.31 
26 Ibidem, p. 84.
27 Ibidem, p. 89.
28 Ibidem. This was reiterated by the Government in 2016, when it stated that armed forces acted 
“as  though bound by the Hague Convention” and that the Convention and its Protocols had already in-
formed the armed forces in relation to the “law of armed conflict doctrine and training policy, particular-
ly with regard to respect for cultural property, precautions in attack and recognition of the Blue Shield”. 
Statement of Baroness Neville-Rolfe, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and Department for Culture, Media and Sport, HL Deb 14 January 2016 vol. 768 
cols. 501-502. 
29 CMSC Draft Bill, p. 3.
30 Ibidem.
31 Statement by John Whittingdale, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, released on 21 
June 2015, mentioned in: Council for British Archaeology, CBA Pushes for Definite Timescales for Protection 
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At the start of the 2016-2017 Parliamentary session, the draft Bill was not 
included in the Queen’s Speech, which normally contains a list of the legislation 
that the Government intends to introduce.32 However, it was mentioned in the 
background notes attached to the Queen’s Speech.33 Consequently, the Bill was 
introduced before the House of Lords on 19 May 2016.34 By September 2016, the 
“Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill [HL] 2016-17” had been through several 
rounds of discussions and was then passed to the House of Commons.35 Here, the 
proposed Bill [no. 66] underwent another three rounds of readings and debates, 
leading to it receiving Royal Assent on 23 February 2017. The Bill was considered 
and agreed upon with remarkable speed. This does not, however, mean that the 
discussions did not involve some important contemporary questions. The follow-
ing section will address some of the key aspects of discussion of the specific ele-
ments of the Act that were raised during the debates in the Parliament.
Key Debates
A number of issues were raised during the debates, but two stand out and deserve 
a more detailed examination, both of which focus on the relationship between do-
mestic regulation and international standards. First, the issue of the scope of the 
application of the Act, specifically focusing on the type of situations to which it is 
applicable, will be examined and juxtaposed with the applicability of the Hague 
Convention and its Protocols. This will be followed by a consideration of the scope 
of the definition of cultural property as adopted in the Act in the context of the 
current debate in international law. 
Scope of application of the Bill 
During the discussions in the House of Commons, a couple of Members of Parliament 
expressed concern that the final Act might not cover organizations such as Daesh or 
Boko Haram because “they are not covered by the protocols to the convention”36, 
of Cultural Property, 21 June 2015, http://new.archaeologyuk.org/news/cba-pushes-for-definite-times-
cales-for-protection-of-cultural-property [accessed: 27.01.2018] and earlier signalized by Ed Vaizey, Minis-
ter of State for Culture and Digital Economy (HC Deb 4 June 2015 vol. 596 col. 739).
32 Cabinet Office, Queen’s Speech 2016, 18 May 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
queens-speech-2016 [accessed: 15.01.2018].
33 Cabinet Office, Queen’s Speech 2016: Background Briefing Notes, 18 May 2016, https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524040/Queen_s_Speech_2016_background_
notes_.pdf [accessed: 15.01.2018], pp. 53-54.
34 UK Parliament, Bill Stages – Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, https://services.parliament.uk/
bills/2016-17/culturalpropertyarmedconflicts/stages.html [accessed: 28.09.2017].
35 Ibidem.
36 Statement of Tim Loughton, MP, Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, HC Deb 31 October 2016 













or that it would not apply in the context of Afghanistan because the “occupying forc-
es” such as the Taliban were not “recognised states [sic]”,37 and Afghanistan had not 
ratified the convention. In response, the Government representative suggested that 
the application of the Act would apply to situations in Syria to a certain extent be-
cause “the UK does not recognise Daesh as a state and because Syria has not ratified 
the second protocol”.38 One may thus get the impression that it was assumed the Act 
would apply only to States, and only if the other State was also bound by the Second 
Protocol. 
These various statements raise a number of different legal questions in rela-
tion to the scope of the application of the Act, which the parliamentarians managed 
to intertwine. One may ask at least three interrelated but distinct questions here, 
which may not yield the same answers. First, would the Act apply to situations of 
a  non-international character, as do the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second 
Protocol? This may include the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, depending 
on the characterization of situations occurring between certain organized armed 
groups and other parties to conflicts on the territories of these States.39 A differ-
ent, albeit related, question relates to whether the Hague Convention and the 
adopted Act would apply to non-State parties to conflicts. The answer to this ques-
tion would clarify whether the Hague Convention and the ratifying Act could apply 
to armed groups such as Daesh or the Taliban. If the parliamentarians’ underlying 
concern was over the recent rise in violations of the rules prohibiting damage and 
destruction to cultural property, then the more valid question would be whether 
the breaches of the Hague Convention – and thus also of the Act – can give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility among members of organized armed groups ac-
cused of committing such offences in the context of non-international armed con-
flicts. This section will address all three issues in turn.
a) Do the Hague Convention and its Protocols apply to non-international armed con-
flicts?
Articles 18 and 19 of the Hague Convention prescribe the limits of the application 
of the Convention. Article 18 refers to situations of an international character, 
much in line with the wording of the common Article 2 to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.40 The 1954 Hague Convention thus applies to all declared wars, 
37 Statement of Kevin Brennan, MP, Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, HC Deb 31 October 2016 
vol. 616 col. 704.
38 Statement of Tracey Crouch, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 
Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, HC Deb 31 October 2016 vol. 616 col. 738.
39 See for instance: F. Hampson, Afghanistan 2001 onwards, and M. Schmitt, Iraq 2003 Onwards, both in: 
E. Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and Classification of Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2012; T.D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, “International Law Studies” 2016, Vol. 92, pp. 353-380.
40 Article 2, as in Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, reprinted in: D. Schindler, J. Toman (eds.), op. cit., 
pp. 459-484 and reproduced in the three remaining 1949 Geneva Conventions. See also International Com-
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armed conflicts arising between State Parties, and cases of total or partial occu-
pation.41 It applies from the moment of the actual start of hostilities or, in cases of 
occupation, even in the absence of hostilities.42
Article 19 of the Hague Convention provides for application of the Conven-
tion to non-international armed conflicts occurring within the territory of a State 
which is Party to the Convention. This article was modelled on both the normative 
content and the language of Article 3, which is common to all four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.43 The provision stipulates that all parties to a conflict of a non-inter-
national character are bound, at a minimum, by those provisions of the Hague Con-
vention which relate to respect for cultural property.44 The extent to which their ob-
ligations to respect cultural property are triggered by the operation of this formu-
lation remains debatable. Whilst most commentators would agree that this would 
cover Article 4 of the Hague Convention,45 some others would support a broader 
application of all provisions relevant to ensuring respect for cultural property.46
A further development came with the adoption of the 1999 Second Proto-
col to the 1954 Hague Convention. Article 3 of the Second Protocol set general 
parameters of ratione materiae application, and linked these to both Article 18 of 
the Hague Convention and the related Article 22(1) of the Protocol. Article 3 of 
the Second Protocol recognized that some provisions of the Protocol apply both 
in situations of peace and armed conflict, whether of an international or non-in-
ternational character. Like Article 18 of the Hague Convention, Article 3(2) of the 
Protocol enabled the effective application of the Protocol between a State Party 
and a non-Party to the Protocol by enabling the latter to accept and comply with 
the provisions of the Second Protocol. 
Article 22 of the Second Protocol contained a formula which was a bit differ-
ent to Article 19 of the Hague Convention, and which enabled its substantively ex-
mittee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2016, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary [accessed: 14.01.2018].
41 Article 18(3) of the Hague Convention.
42 J. Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary on the Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Its Protocol, Signed on 14 May 1954 in 
the Hague, and on Other Instruments of International Law Concerning Such Protection, Aldershot, Dartmouth 
1996, pp. 196-197.
43 Idem, Cultural Property in War: Improvement in Protection: Commentary on the 1999 Second Protocol to the 
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, UNESCO, Paris 
2009, pp. 392 and 396; UNESCO, Records…, as mentioned in J. Toman, The Protection…, pp. 207-209, 313.
44 Article 19(1) of the Hague Convention (emphasis added).
45 R. O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2006, p. 98; Article 4 of the Hague Convention prescribes conditions for the respect of cultural property by 
refraining from, among others, any use of the property for purposes that are likely to expose it to destruc-
tion or damage and from acts of hostility against such property including reprisals. 













tended application. Article 22(1), unlike Article 19(1), did not restrict its application 
to certain provisions related to respect for cultural property.47 Instead it stipulated 
simply that the Protocol would apply in cases of non-international armed conflicts 
occurring “within the territory of one of the Parties”.48 This meant that the Proto-
col’s regime of enhanced protection would also be binding in situations of non-in-
ternational armed conflicts.49 
Through the concurrent ratification of the Hague Convention and both Proto-
cols without any substantive changes, the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 
2017 will apply to international armed conflicts on the UK’s own territory, as well 
as enemy territory if that State is also a Party to the Convention or if it accepts and 
applies the Convention.50 This will enable the UK to supplement the legal frame-
work of the Hague Convention. It will also allow it to replace the special protection 
regime, regulated by the First Protocol, with the enhanced protection enshrined in 
the Second Protocol for property that has been awarded the status of both special 
and enhanced protection. 
The Act will also apply to non-international armed conflicts occurring on the 
UK’s territory and on foreign territory where the UK is engaged in a conflict of 
a non-international character and the territory belongs to a State which is Party 
to the Second Protocol. In the context of the UK’s operations against Daesh, this 
means that the Hague Convention would apply, whilst the Second Protocol would 
not. This is because the Hague Convention has been ratified by both Syria and 
Iraq, but neither of these States are Parties to the Second Protocol.51 Thus, in this 
case, the UK would be bound to apply the provisions of the Hague Convention. 
It may, as a matter of policy, also apply those enshrined in the Second Protocol, 
but it is not obliged to do so. In the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, none of 
the relevant treaty provisions would be applicable due to the fact that Afghani-
stan is not a Party to the Hague Convention nor its Protocols.52 It is worth noting 
that, aside from the conventional obligations considered in the context of the Act, 
 
47 Article 22 represents a blend of various formulas borrowed from common Article 3 of 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 
(“Additional Protocol II”), reprinted in: D. Schindler, J. Toman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 775-818.
48 Article 22(1) of the Second Protocol. Both Toman and O’Keefe advocate reading this provision in the 
context of both the common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II. 
J. Toman, Cultural Property…, pp. 414-432; R. O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, 
pp. 97-98, 245-247.
49 Articles 10-14 of the Second Protocol.
50 In line with Article 18(3) of the Hague Convention and Article 3(2) of the Second Protocol.
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the UK will be bound, whether in international or non-international armed con-
flicts, by the rules of customary international law relevant to the protection of 
cultural property.53
It is true that the application of the Act to conflicts such as those in Syria or Af-
ghanistan may be limited. This is related chiefly to the fact that these conflicts take 
place in the territory of States which are non-Parties to either the Second Protocol 
or both the Hague Convention and its Protocols. This will not, however, be linked to 
the existence or the recognition of Daesh or the Taliban as States under internation-
al law, and certainly not because such organized groups are regarded as “occupying 
forces”. They cannot be occupying forces because occupation arises only in situa-
tions of international armed conflict, where one State’s armed forces place part or 
all of another State’s territory under its authority, and where that authority is well 
established and can be exercised.54 Arguably, the recognition of States does not 
lead to the attainment of legal personality in international law or the requirements 
for statehood under international law.55 Any such aspiring entities must, instead, 
satisfy in the first place the four key conditions set out in the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.56 Neither Daesh nor the Taliban 
would satisfy all the requirements for statehood at this point of time, and as they 
are not State Parties to the Hague Convention and its Protocols the application of 
the Act to them will be limited.57 Whilst the scope of application of the Act in this 
context is likely to be limited, this will not preclude the possibility of it being applied 
ratione personae to organized armed groups such as Daesh or the Taliban. The next 
section will explore the scope of the personal application of the Act. 
b)	 Do	the	Hague	Convention	and	its	Protocols	apply	to	a	non-signatory	Party?
A rather different question is the issue of who is bound by the Hague Convention 
and its Protocols. First and foremost, State Parties are bound by these treaties. 
Insofar as the ratione personae application of the Hague Convention is concerned, 
53 J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vols. I and II, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2006 (in the hard copy) and an updated online version at: https://ihl-databas-
es.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul [accessed:14.01.2018] (“CIHL Study”).
54 Article 42 of Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Reg-
ulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat 2277 TS 
539, as well as Article 42 of Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, 32 Stat 
1803 TS 403 (“Hague Regulations”) as reprinted in: D. Schindler, J. Toman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 55-87. For more 
analysis of the occupation see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports, 2004, para. 78; Case Concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, 
ICJ Reports, 2005, para. 172.
55 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 49 Stat 3097, art. 3.
56 Ibidem, art. 1.
57 N. Zamir, The Armed Conflict(s) Against the Islamic State, “Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law” 













there is no doubt that it applies to States which are Parties to the Convention and 
which have mutual relations.58 An application of the modified clausula si omnes 
means that the Act will bind the UK in any declared war or international armed 
conflict where its opponent/s or the other Parties to the conflict are also Parties to 
the Hague Convention, in their mutual relations.59 
The UK will also be bound by the Hague Convention vis-à-vis an adversary 
who is not a Party to the Convention, but who has accepted it and is de facto com-
plying with its provisions.60 This regulation will also extend to coalition operations. 
In situations where one of the coalition members is not a Party to the Hague Con-
vention, the Convention and thus the Bill will not apply to the mutual relations be-
tween the UK and that coalition partner,61 unless such a Party makes a declaration 
and acts according to the relevant provisions.62 
A separate question is whether the Act will apply to non-State Parties to the 
Hague Convention, such as organized armed groups in non-international armed 
conflicts.63 During the debate in the House of Commons, MPs questioned whether 
the Bill would apply because of the limitations of the Hague Convention and its 
Protocols in this respect.64 In this context, one has to stress that Article 19 of the 
1954 Hague Convention has been viewed through a prism of the applicability of 
Article 3, common to the Geneva Conventions. In this context, UNESCO inter-
preted Article 19 as conferring a legal obligation on each adversary based on their 
“contractual engagements undertaken by a community of which he is a part”.65 
In other words, as the adopted international obligations became part of national 
law, they also become binding on “national citizens”, including rebel forces.66 It was 
58 Article 18 of the Hague Convention; Article 18(3), Schedule 1 of the Cultural Property (Armed Con-
flicts) Act 2017, Chapter 6, 23 February 2017.
59 Ibidem. The existence of this principle can be traced back to the Hague Regulations. J. Toman, 
The Protection…, p. 198; idem, Cultural Property…, p. 65.
60 Article 18 of the Hague Convention; Article 18, Schedule 1 of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) 
Act 2017; J. Toman, The Protection…, pp. 199-201.
61 C. Forrest, op. cit., p. 82.
62 Note that it remains unclear whether the UK issued such a declaration, in addition to the required ac-
tual compliance, in the context of the past involvement of the UK in coalition operations in Iraq from 2003 
onwards. 
63 The term “party” in this sentence denotes, in line with the commentary, any party to the conflict – 
as opposed to the term Party/Parties, with an upper-case “P” to indicate a contracting State Party to the 
conflict, thus bound by the convention. J. Toman, Cultural Property…, pp. 409-410. One has to note, though, 
that whilst this is not exactly how the term “party” is included in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conven-
tions, but is based on the interpretation and meaning espoused in the commentary, it appears to lead to 
the same result. 
64 See text above attached to notes 39-41.
65 Toman relied here on the commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. J. Toman, The Protection…, 
pp. 209, 211-212.
66 The only way to avoid the need for compliance with the legally binding obligations resulting from the 
Geneva Conventions was through the use of the denunciation procedure provided by the Conventions. 
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only natural that authorities such as rebel forces would also be inclined, Toman 
argued, to protect cultural property in support of the nation or community for 
which they were fighting, and that destruction of it would contradict the aims of 
their struggle.67 However, it should not be surprising that Daesh did not hold back 
from the extensive destruction of Palmyra and other cultural sites and artefacts 
in Syria and Iraq, for their preservation would not have advanced their political or 
religious goals.68 One can also argue that the destruction of this cultural property 
might have been regarded as a show of strength and power in support of Daesh’s 
ideological and religious convictions. 
Both UNESCO and Toman’s commentaries link the application with the con-
cept of nationality or, more precisely, to all people under the relevant State’s juris-
diction. This is admittedly only one of several theories proposed in support of the 
binding nature of Article 3 on non-State organized armed groups.69 The 2016 ICRC 
Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions mentions four other possible justi-
fications in this context, but avoids giving a definitive answer beyond restating that 
non-State organized groups are bound by the provisions of Article 3.70 There is no 
reason why Article 19 of the Hague Convention should not be seen as applicable to 
non-State organized armed groups, especially as this provision also explicitly refers 
to all parties to the conflict, and not State Parties. 
Interestingly, during the negotiation of the 1954 Hague Conventions, the UK 
delegation was the only one to oppose the adoption of Article 19, considering it to 
be “unworkable”.71 The delegation proposed deleting Article 19, or at least refor-
mulating it, with the lesser obligation of “to endeavour” replacing “to be bound” 
to apply the provisions of the Convention by all parties to the conflict. The Com-
mittee of the Conference uniformly rejected this proposal and agreed to adopt 
Article 19.72
Note that this procedure would not, in most circumstances, be available to rebel forces or organized armed 
groups, as denunciation could be undertaken only by the authority internationally recognized as a compe-
tent government. Ibidem.
67 Ibidem.
68 P. Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against Property or a Crime Against People?, 
“John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law” 2016, Vol. 15(336), pp. 357-361.
69 For more on this, see L. Moir, The Law of the Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2002, pp. 52-58 and 96-99; L. Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in Internation-
al Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 9-12; M. Sassòli, Taking Armed Groups Seriously: 
Ways to Improve Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, “Journal of International Humanitarian Le-
gal Studies” 2010, Vol. 1(1), pp. 10-14; S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2012, pp. 236-246. 
70 Common Article 3 to 1949 Geneva Conventions, International Committee of the Red Cross, op. cit., 
paras. 504, 507-508. 
71 UNESCO, Records…, para. 1065, also in J. Toman, The Protection…, pp. 209, 214.













The word “endeavour” features, though, in Paragraph 2 of Article 19. It consti-
tutes an invitation to all parties to the conflict to enter into bilateral agreements, 
permitting a wider scope of the protection of cultural property. Whilst allowing 
parties the freedom to extend the application of the Hague Convention, this oppor-
tunity has not been made use of in practice. Consequently, the experts in this field 
meeting in 1983 recognized that an effective realization of bilateral agreements 
during conflicts was unrealistic and unlikely to succeed.73 Accordingly, a suggestion 
was made that unilateral but concordant statements should be treated as a form of 
such “special agreements”.74 
Article 22 of the Second Protocol broadened the scope of its material appli-
cation, as compared to the formula used in Article 19 of the Hague Convention. 
It also reinforced the remit of its personal application to all parties to the conflict, 
including non-State actors, in line with the application of the common Article 3 and 
the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention.75 
In light of the above, there could be two situations of non-international 
armed conflicts that may call for the application of the UK Cultural Property Act. 
The first would involve an armed conflict confined to the territory of the UK. 
The other would involve the UK as a party to a non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) occurring on foreign territory. In both cases, the Act would be binding on 
the UK. There is no question that the Act itself would apply to UK personnel, 
both military and civilian, as well as UK nationals even in the context of armed 
conflicts occurring beyond the UK’s borders.76 This may be an important issue, 
especially in NIACs fought on the territory of the State that has not ratified the 
Hague Convention or its Protocols.
In a NIAC occurring on UK territory, the Act will also be binding on any non-
State actors engaged in a fight against the UK authorities, or in a struggle among 
themselves. In the second scenario, i.e. outside the UK’s territory, foreign non-
State actors may find themselves subject to the Act’s regulation. Section 3 of the 
Act prescribes individual criminal responsibility for a serious violation of the Sec-
ond Protocol, which can be committed by any person, regardless of their nation-
ality, and anywhere in the world.77 Two prohibited acts include violations against 
 
 
73 Ibidem, p. 216.
74 Ibidem.
75 Idem, Cultural Property…, p. 418.
76 Sections 3-4 of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017. As Sections 3 and 4 explicitly use 
the broad term, “persons”, it is clear that this criminal jurisdiction could extend to residents or persons with 
other significant links to the UK, as prescribed in other UK domestic acts such as the International Criminal 
Court Act 2001 (Sections 51, 58, 68). 
77 Section 4 enshrines the same regulation in regard to ancillary crimes. Sections 3-4 of the Cultural Prop-
erty (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017.
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cultural property under enhanced protection, whilst a third refers to the extensive 
destruction of, or appropriation of, cultural property protected both under the 
Hague Convention and the Second Protocol.78 
Additionally, non-State organized armed groups will be bound by the equiv-
alent rules of customary international humanitarian law applicable in NIACs, and 
directly by the application of Article 19 if the conflict in question takes part on the 
territory of a State which is a Party to the Hague Convention. If the latter is also 
a Party to the Second Protocol, the non-State organized group will also be bound 
by the provisions of the Second Protocol, whose material application will, as men-
tioned above, go beyond the obligations to respect cultural property.79 In a situa-
tion where such a conflict occurs on the territory of a State which is not a Party to 
the Hague Convention and its Protocols, the non-State organized group will remain 
bound by the relevant customary international humanitarian law. It may, of course, 
be subject to criminal prosecution in relation to violations of the Hague Convention 
and the Second Protocol, as provided for by Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.80 
In conclusion, and in response to the queries raised during the discussions in 
the House of Commons, one should be assured that organizations such as Daesh or 
Boko Haram, whilst not bound by the Act itself (except for the sections establish-
ing individual criminal responsibility), will be bound by the provisions of the Hague 
Convention – or, at the very least, the relevant customary norms.81 This is because 
Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic both ratified the Hague Convention.82 Nigeria 
is also Party to the 1999 Second Protocol so, in the context of the ongoing NIAC, 
the Boko Haram group will also be bound by the provisions of the Second Proto-
col.83 It is true that Afghanistan is not Party to any of these treaties, but the Taliban 
group will be bound by the relevant customary international humanitarian rules 
and, from September 2017, subject to possible criminal prosecution in line with the 
newly adopted Act’s jurisdiction over criminal offences.
78 This represents the incorporation of Articles 15 and 16 of the Second Protocol into the Act. See also the 
further discussion in regard to criminal responsibility clauses in part three of this article. 
79 See text attached to notes 49-51 above.
80 For a further discussion of the relevant customary international humanitarian law applicable to cultural 
property, see Rules 38-40 with its associated practice, as identified in a CIHL Study. See also P. Gersten-
blith, op. cit., p. 352.
81 One should also bear in mind that the Act cannot be applied retrospectively.
82 ICRC Database on International Humanitarian Law Treaties, op. cit.
83 Ibidem. Some provisions of the Hague Convention and its Protocols, and consequently of the Act, apply 
both during peacetime and during armed conflicts. For the latter provisions to come into play, an armed 
conflict needs to involve the UK as one of the parties. The UK does not appear to be currently involved in 













Definition of Cultural Property
The definition of cultural property incorporated into the Cultural Property Act fol-
lows to the letter the definition adopted in the Hague Convention.84 Article 1 of the 
latter prescribes that cultural property is property, both movable and immovable, 
of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.85 This provided for 
a  more general definition, which was preferred by some of the negotiating dele-
gates in 1954 in The Hague.86 It has been supplemented by a non-exhaustive list 
of examples, including monuments of art, architecture, or history, archaeological 
sites, assemblages of buildings of historical or artistic interest, as well as works of 
art, scientific collections, book collections and archives, and – importantly – col-
lections of reproductions of cultural property.87 The definition of cultural property 
also includes buildings dedicated to preserving or exhibiting movable cultural prop-
erty, such as museums, libraries, depositories of archives and – during an armed 
conflict – storage and shelter facilities, and centres containing monuments.88 This 
definition is considered to reflect customary international law.89
The definition was adopted with the aim of arriving at a common standard 
that would be acceptable to the majority of States. The ownership or origin of the 
property is irrelevant in this context; what is important is its value to the cultural 
heritage of a people. This value is based on the property’s importance, which implies 
a subjective and relative element. Such value is inherently difficult to determine 
using uniform and conclusive criteria. 
As noted by one peer during the second reading of the Bill in the House of 
Lords, the perception of what constitutes cultural property or cultural heritage 
changes over time.90 In this day and age, some works of art exist only in digi-
tal form. Thus, concern was expressed during the debates in Parliament about 
whether the Act would also encompass digital cultural property. The Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Karen Bradley, gave an assurance that the 
definition was broad enough to include “modern or digital types of cultural prop-
84 Section 1 of the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017.
85 Article 1 of the Hague Convention.
86 J. Toman, The Protection…, p. 48.
87 This definition is replicated by the subsequent Protocols. Article 1 of the Hague Convention; Article 1 
of the First Protocol and Article 1 of the Second Protocol.
88 Ibidem.
89 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004 
(“UK Manual”), p. 71. Note that the description of cultural property subject to enhanced protection by the 
operation of the Second Protocol was deemed to be treaty-based only. M.N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 
2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2017 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0”), p. 534.
90 Statement of the Earl of Clancarty, Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, HL Deb 6 June 2016 
vol. 773 col. 598.
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erty”.91 It is, after all, up to the UK to designate which property within its territory 
is of great importance to its cultural heritage. One may ask whether the concern 
of the Peers, and subsequently the Members of Parliament, was justified? Yes, 
certainly. Recent debates surrounding the law of cyber operations show that 
there could be a real risk to the full inclusion of digital cultural property as being 
subject to protection during armed conflicts in cyber space. 
The International Group of Experts working on the 2013 Tallinn Manual on 
Cyber Warfare, and its updated version in 2017, was seemingly split in determin-
ing whether non-tangible manifestations of cultural property were subject to pro-
tection against the effects of cyber operations.92 Some experts relied on a literal 
reading of Article 53 of Additional Protocol I, which offers protection to “cultural 
objects” and places of worship.93 This definition is wider than the Hague Conven-
tion in that it covers places of worship and cultural objects, which constitute the 
spiritual heritage of peoples. However, the protection offered in Article 53 is not 
conferred on, for example, museums, libraries, or centres of monuments. It differs 
from the scope identified in Rule 38 of the CIHL Study, which follows the wider 
definition of cultural property in the Hague Convention, which is considered the 
customary norm. The general interpretation, though, is that both regulations do 
relate to physical, tangible items.94 
Accordingly, the experts argued that the term “objects” pertained only to tan-
gible physical objects, and thus limited the notion of cultural property to tangible 
objects – with the exclusion of any intangible pieces, such as digital cultural prop-
erty.95 Other experts noted that in other branches of law, the notion of proper-
ty also encompassed intangible items such as intellectual property. For them, the 
relevant question was whether such property could meet a cultural requirement.96 
It appears that the experts working on the Tallinn Manual could not come to an 
agreement on this issue, either in 2013 or 2017. Whilst they recognized that cul-
tural property needs to be protected, they left open the question of the status of 
digital cultural property.
Given that the Hague Convention and its Protocols offer much more specific, 
detailed, and well established regulation than the current understanding of what 
 
91 Statement of Karen Bradley, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Cultural Property 
(Armed Conflicts) Bill, HC Deb 31 October 2016 vol. 616 col. 698.
92 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 535.
93 Article 53 of the Additional Protocol I provides that it is prohibited: “(a) to commit any acts of hostility 
directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or 
spiritual heritage of peoples”.
94 C. Johannot-Gradis, Protecting the Past for the Future: How Does Law Protect Tangible and Intangible 
Heritage in Armed Conflict?, “International Review of the Red Cross” 2015, Vol. 97, p. 1259.














rules may govern the conduct of cyber operations, the former should be the guid-
ing legislation in relation to digital cultural property. This is in accordance with the 
well-established rule of lex specialis derogat legi generali. This approach also has a po-
tential to permit more consistent legal findings than those identified in the Tallinn 
Manual. The starting point has to be the Hague Convention’s definition of cultural 
property, which does not, in principle, prohibit its application to non-material items. 
The concept of property implies an idea of ownership, rather than being dependent 
on the nature of the asset. As it is up to each individual State to designate a list of its 
cultural property, it may include digital cultural assets. It is possible that a digital re-
cording of an anthem or a digital reproduction of a famous painting may constitute 
cultural property within the definition of the Act. In other words, there is nothing 
in the Hague Convention, and consequently in the Act, to prevent such property 
being so determined, either by the UK or by any other States Parties. However, 
given the historic interpretation of the Hague Convention’s definition of cultural 
property, it remains to be seen whether cultural property will indeed encompass 
digital forms of representation.97
Conclusions
There is no doubt that ratification of the Hague Convention and its Protocols by 
the UK came as a much awaited and welcome step. It enables the UK authorities 
to provide a much greater protection of cultural property located in the UK in 
the event of an armed conflict, and possibly opens the door to domestic prose-
cutions of serious breaches of the Second Protocol against non-nationals in the 
forum State. However, despite some attempts to tackle some of the challenging 
and topical issues, the new legislation does not resolve some of the contempo-
rary debates. One may say that this was not the purpose of the process, but at 
the same time this was a missed opportunity to address some of the more thorny 
issues. Neither the new legislation nor the debates in Parliament provide much 
of an insight into whether, for example, non-tangible digital cultural property is 
also protected. When giving effect to the repression of violations in its domes-
tic jurisdiction, in line with Article 28 of the Hague Convention, the UK decided 
to establish a broad jurisdictional basis that permits the criminal prosecution of 
offences committed by non-nationals outside the territory of the forum State, 
including – in the context of non-international armed conflicts – going beyond 
 
97 This will be also relevant to a discussion about the status of digital archives and collections, digital 
reproductions of cultural property, and digital storage. In the specific context of digital reproductions of 
cultural property, there has been made an unwarranted conclusion that only some reproductions – either 
limited in amount, or related to original property which has been destroyed – should achieve the status of 
protected cultural property (Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 535). This does not seem to be matched by an equivalent 
limitation on reproductions of cultural property under the Hague Convention. 
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mere respect-related provisions. However, this issue remains contested, and oth-
er States may well take a different position in this regard.98 
For the UK, the ratification was in practice merely a formality. Its armed forces 
had already been observing their duties to protect cultural property during mili-
tary operations, and had been trained accordingly since the UK became Party to 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in the late 1990s. Respect for cul-
tural property was not only incorporated in the UK Manual of the Law of Armed Con-
flict,99 but also in the targeting doctrine and policy and in the military practice.100 
The Act has formalized these responsibilities for UK personnel.101 In early 2014, 
a joint military cultural property protection working group began working on es-
tablishing a unit of specialists dedicated to the protection of cultural property, and 
reviewing training in this field.102 There is no doubt that the UK’s engagement in 
the protection of cultural property, both domestically and worldwide, is a serious 
commitment, and the ratification of the relevant treaties represents yet another 
reflection of this. Time will tell whether this commitment will translate into the ac-
tive prosecution of cases, which would add further clarity on the interpretational 
issues left unresolved in the debates during the ratification process. 
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